Suchergebnisse

The concept of the ethnographic principle is rarely found in the literature, and there is hardly a legal qualification for it. However, historical material (in cases of the Lithuanian, Czech, Bulgarian and Polish peoples) indicates that the ethnographic principle is a significant political and geopolitical phenomenon. This phenomen is especialy characteristic of the development of the peoples of the region of Central and Eastern Europe. First, the ethnographic principle was closely related to the national principle, although it did not coincide with it. The concept of the ethnographic principle points to the special anatomy of nation states, where the basis is ethnic / linguistic culture. Secondly, the advancement of culture to the fore indicated the recognition of its significance, which had not happened before. Consequently, it was a question of freeing this culture from the restrictions imposed on it and even compensating for the damage caused to it. Thirdly, the culture, raised to the state level, needed appropriate guarantees for the future. The article reveals the tendency of great states at the level of their policies and propaganda to act according to the ethnographic principle, thereby encouraging the formation of national states. However, when the latter became a fact, another tendency arose: the Western world began to apply the criteria of a liberal civil society to new states (according to the principle of jus civis romanus sum). This was too hard for the new states. In this context, the alternative was the Soviet ethno-federalist protectorate, which, although under the conditions of a repressive system, actually continued to implement the projections of the ethnographic principle. A fixed paradox: the ethnographic principle, which originated in the West as a variant of democratization, gained strength thanks to Russia, while the West remained, as it were, in aristocratic opposition to this course. The ethnographic principle has not yet acquired a clearer legal legitimacy. But as a historical category, it can serve as a study of the history of Modern times, and especially the Soviet period. ; Etnografinio principo sąvoka, aptinkama politinėje ir mokslinėje literatūroje, regis, neturi aiškios visuotinai priimtos to principo juridinės kvalifikacijos. Bet istoristinis požiūris į procesus rytinėje Europos dalyje XIXa. antroje pusėje–XXa. pirmoje pusėje leistų teigti, kad etnografinis principas– tai esminė Vidurio Rytų Europos regiono formavimosi ypatybė. Straipsnyje atlikta lietuvių, čekų, bulgarų ir lenkų tautų– kaip atvejų, sudarančių prielaidą regiono tipologizacijai,– raidos apžvalga liudytų, kad etnografinis principas orientavo į šio regiono tautinės valstybės teritorijos nustatymą, siekiant tai valstybei sudaryti sąlygas saugiai bei efektyviai egzistuoti. Kartu straipsnyje pasirinktas tyrimo rakursas leidžia naujai pažvelgti į minimo regiono valstybių probleminę raidą Vakarų ir Rusijos priešpriešos kontekste. Straipsnyje konstatuojama, kad etnografinis principas neįgijo juridinio principo statuso, bet jis gali būti naudingas kaip istorinė kategorija tyrinėjant naujųjų laikų istoriją ir ypač sovietmetį.

The Curzon Line is usually identified as the line of 8 December 1919 (similar to the current eastern border of Poland), running to the east of the Daugavpils-Vilnius-Hrodna railway. Typical historiographical texts state that the Soviet government decided to ignore the Curzon Line after 17 July 1920. But in fact, the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line on 13–14 July and continued to occupy Vilna (Vilnius). Another inaccuracy follows from this one. The prevailing trend is to interpret the Lithuanian state's situation in 1920 as facing one of two ideology-based alternatives: either Lithuania is sovietised, or it is 'saved' by Poland, which occupies Vilnius and separates Lithuania from contact with Soviet Russia. But this raises a whole swathe of questions: how should the Lithuanians' struggle for Vilnius dur-ing the whole interwar period be viewed? How should assistance to Lithuanians from other countries, such as Germany, the USSR and Great Britain, be assessed? Finally, how should the return of Vilnius to Lithuania in 1939 be viewed? There is no answer to these questions, but the possibility of Lithuania as a buffer zone thanks to the Curzon Line, is ignored or hardly analysed at all. Using historical documents from Lithuania, Great Britain and Russia, and referring to the studies by Alfred Erich Senn, this article aims to find an answer to the question, why was the idea of Lithuania as a buffer state not realised in the summer of 1920? The idea that it would be more appropriate to call the line alongside Lithuania established at the Spa Conference 'the Lloyd George Line' is also discussed.

The Curzon Line is usually identified as the line of 8 December 1919 (similar to the current eastern border of Poland), running to the east of the Daugavpils-Vilnius-Hrodna railway. Typical historiographical texts state that the Soviet government decided to ignore the Curzon Line after 17 July 1920. But in fact, the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line on 13–14 July and continued to occupy Vilna (Vilnius). Another inaccuracy follows from this one. The prevailing trend is to interpret the Lithuanian state's situation in 1920 as facing one of two ideology-based alternatives: either Lithuania is sovietised, or it is 'saved' by Poland, which occupies Vilnius and separates Lithuania from contact with Soviet Russia. But this raises a whole swathe of questions: how should the Lithuanians' struggle for Vilnius dur-ing the whole interwar period be viewed? How should assistance to Lithuanians from other countries, such as Germany, the USSR and Great Britain, be assessed? Finally, how should the return of Vilnius to Lithuania in 1939 be viewed? There is no answer to these questions, but the possibility of Lithuania as a buffer zone thanks to the Curzon Line, is ignored or hardly analysed at all. Using historical documents from Lithuania, Great Britain and Russia, and referring to the studies by Alfred Erich Senn, this article aims to find an answer to the question, why was the idea of Lithuania as a buffer state not realised in the summer of 1920? The idea that it would be more appropriate to call the line alongside Lithuania established at the Spa Conference 'the Lloyd George Line' is also discussed.

[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English] ; [straipsnis ir santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba] Straipsnį inspiravo Lenkijos, taip pat Anglijos, Rusijos ir tikriausiai kitų šalių – bet, deja, ne Lietuvos – istoriografijoje gerai žinomas klausimas: kodėl 1791 m. pavasarį Anglijos vadovaujamos koalicijos karas su Rusija neįvyko. Prieinama prie išvados, kad Vilhelmo Pito Jaunesniojo Rytų Europoje projektuota kolektyvinė komercinė valstybių sistema neturėjo galimybių būti realizuota. Kartu dėmesys straipsnyje telkiamas į Lenkijos–Lietuvos valstybės vietą bei vaidmenį tarptautiniame konflikte. Laikomasi nuomonės, kad Varšuvos 1788–1790 m. vykdyta orientacija į Prūsiją buvo žalinga Lenkijos–Lietuvos valstybei. Daroma išvada, kad negalima adekvačiai vertinti valstybės vykdytų reformų – kartu ir 1791 m. gegužės 3 d. priimtos konstitucijos – neatsižvelgiant į tarptautinės politikos kontekstą.

The paper discusses the territorial-geopolitical aspect of the Lithuanian policy during the FirstWorld War, which is still not sufficiently studied or properly understood. It concerns the strategicline proposed by members of Lithuania's conservative elite. The visible side of the linewas a game of orientations: first pro-Russian, then pro-German. However, these orientationswere based on an ethnographic principle, which created preconditions for the practical developmentof the Lithuanian nation. On the other hand, the ethnographic principle was relatedto the idea of national self-determination, raised by the democratic thought, which paved theway for Lithuanian national statehood. Therefore, the strategic line offered by some of theLithuanian elite went beyond party ideology and became national.Key Words: ethnographic territory, the Nemunas basin, Suwałki Gubernia, Vilnius, geopolitical ally DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15181/ahuk.v31i0.1203

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In public life, interpretations of the history of the USSR often fail to take into account achievements in the study of history or even ignore them. On the other hand, it should be recognized that there is as yet no unanimously accepted methodology to interpret the history of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this does not justify the tendency to interpret the history of the USSR using methodology reminiscent of the orthodox paradigm of the mid-20th century. From an academic point of view, such a paradigm does not stand-up to criticism; from a political point of view, it presupposes an escalation in international conflict and is as such, fallacious.

In public life, interpretations of the history of the USSR often fail to take into account achievements in the study of history or even ignore them. On the other hand, it should be recognized that there is as yet no unanimously accepted methodology to interpret the history of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this does not justify the tendency to interpret the history of the USSR using methodology reminiscent of the orthodox paradigm of the mid-20th century. From an academic point of view, such a paradigm does not stand-up to criticism; from a political point of view, it presupposes an escalation in international conflict and is as such, fallacious.

The article deals with the issue on Russian foreign policy in length of one year -from September 2001 till October 2002. It's evident, that the attacks of terrorists on the Twin Towers in New York signalled the turn in Russian foreign policy under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin from confrontation with USA and Euro Atlantic organizations to the cooperation with the said opponents. The turn was influenced by the objective bankrupt to confront with the West. Otherwise, the domestic high popularity rating of President Putin and his image of the State's consolidator, what has been originated on the brutal represses of Chechnya's separatism and the authoritarian concentration of power, served for the taken, non popular in Russia, course of ally with the West and particularly with USA. It's shown within the article, how fluctuated the emphasises of Putin's policy in the analysed period, i.e. from the cooperation of USA and Russia in crushing the Afghanistan's Talibs, from the entering into the pact START - 3 and establishing NATO - Russian Council to the reactivated flirtation with Peking and Phenian, and the blackmail with the rockets "Satana". It is also established, how Putin's diplomacy relates the brewed Iraq crisis and the case of Chechnya militants in Georgia Pankisi pass and how for the pro western political course was obtained the transit through Lithuania to/ from Kaliningrad. In sum, Putin just modifies the previous Russian (Eugenie Primakov) so called. [to full text]

The article deals with the issue on Russian foreign policy in length of one year -from September 2001 till October 2002. It's evident, that the attacks of terrorists on the Twin Towers in New York signalled the turn in Russian foreign policy under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin from confrontation with USA and Euro Atlantic organizations to the cooperation with the said opponents. The turn was influenced by the objective bankrupt to confront with the West. Otherwise, the domestic high popularity rating of President Putin and his image of the State's consolidator, what has been originated on the brutal represses of Chechnya's separatism and the authoritarian concentration of power, served for the taken, non popular in Russia, course of ally with the West and particularly with USA. It's shown within the article, how fluctuated the emphasises of Putin's policy in the analysed period, i.e. from the cooperation of USA and Russia in crushing the Afghanistan's Talibs, from the entering into the pact START - 3 and establishing NATO - Russian Council to the reactivated flirtation with Peking and Phenian, and the blackmail with the rockets "Satana". It is also established, how Putin's diplomacy relates the brewed Iraq crisis and the case of Chechnya militants in Georgia Pankisi pass and how for the pro western political course was obtained the transit through Lithuania to/ from Kaliningrad. In sum, Putin just modifies the previous Russian (Eugenie Primakov) so called. [to full text]